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The Open Society and Violence in the Media
Jerome A. Barron*
I. INTRODUCTION
The hijacking of the planes that assailed the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon on September 11, 2001 projected images of death and destruction on
the television screen that many of us will remember always. These visual images
brought the horrific reality of that day to millions of Americans who lived far
away from both New York and Washington. Recollection of these terrible images
of people running and jumping from crumbling skyscrapers reminds us of the
power of the television screen to project the reality of violence. The capacity of
television to do this is not doubted. But those who produce violent programming
for purposes of entertainment contend that its impact is different and does not
influence their viewers or otherwise affect them. Social scientists in response tell
us that violent content does indeed have an impact, particularly on children. If we
take this research seriously, we have to ask a basic question. Is American society,
governed as it is by a First Amendment regime which treasures freedom of
expression, ready to confront the problem of violence in the media? In answer to
this question, I suggest to you that our First Amendment law is presently in a
state of great ferment and transition and that now our society may be willing to
confront this issue.
In the legal academy and in the courts of the United States, there is currently
a revolution in traditional ways of thinking about First Amendment theory. Part
of this First Amendment revisionism centers on hate speech on campus and on
female pornography.' The recent literature on these subjects focuses not on the
impact regulation would have on free speech, but on the harm done to those who
are victimized by such expression. There is almost a generational divide in First
Amendment scholarship between the scholars who insist that all content-based
regulation is invalid under the First Amendment and a new generation who are
no longer as confident as their elders that free speech is, and should be, the
ultimate constitutional value for society.
* Harold H. Greene Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School; B.A. 1955, Tufts
University; J.D. 1958, Yale University Law School; LL.M. 1960, George Washington University Law School. I
would like to thank David Barron, Tom Dienes and Teresa Schwartz for their helpful comments. I would also
like to thank Mark Hershfield for his excellent research assistance and Katherine Poon-Sham for her excellent
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I. For a discussion of racist speech, see Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracisin Rules: Constitutional
Narratives in Collision, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 343 (1991). For an examination of feminist pornography, see
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985).
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Professor Richard Delgado explains the case for regulation of racist speech
from the victim's perspective: "Minority protectors see the injury of one who has
been subject to a racial assault as not a mere isolated event, but as part of an
interrelated series of acts, by which persons of color are subordinated, and which
will follow the victim wherever she goes."'2 Delgado concedes that there is an
equally strong argument against allowing regulation of racist speech. He
acknowledges that a claim for protection of the racist's right to speak "is part of
the never-ending vigilance necessary to preserve freedom of expression in a
society that is too prone to balance it away."'
Delgado's there-is-justice-in-both-your-houses attitude sounds temperate and
mild. However, in terms of traditional First Amendment thinking, it is revolutionary
since he concludes as follows: "Nothing in constitutional or moral theory
requires one answer rather than the other. Social science, case law, and the
experience of other nations provide some illumination." 4 But, in fact, American
constitutional theory does not treat both these positions as possessing equal authority.
The tradition against the recognition of controls on racist speech is much stronger
than solicitude for the victims of that speech. But there is undeniably a new debate in
the United States. Should First Amendment law also focus on the harm speech
causes rather than just on the harm regulation of speech will cause? Expression
which causes specific harms to groups within society who are in a subordinate
power position may be more subject to regulation than was previously thought
either possible or desirable.
With respect to racist speech, the Supreme Court of the United States has
generally adhered to the classic First Amendment position that emotional harms
suffered by the targets of racist expressive activity cannot justify regulation. This
position was the essential message of those cases protecting the right of Nazis to
march through Skokie, Illinois, a predominantly Jewish Chicago suburb.5 As
recently as 1992, a St. Paul, Minnesota hate speech ordinance was struck down
by the United States Supreme Court in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.6 Justice Scalia,
speaking for the Court, invalidated the St. Paul ordinance on the grounds that it
was underinclusive and that it discriminated on the basis of content. The St. Paul
ordinance was deemed defective for singling out for punishment only those
fighting words which were based on race, creed, color, or religion . Fighting
words reflecting other kinds of hostility such as political affiliation, sexual
preference, or union membership were not sanctioned. Nevertheless, ten years
before R.A. V., the Supreme Court excluded an entire category of expression from
2. Delgado, supra note 1, at 347-48.
3. Id. at 348.
4. Id.
5. See Village of Skokie v. Nat'l Socialist Party, 373 N.E.2d 21 (111. 1978); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d
1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
6. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
7. Id. at 393-94.
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First Amendment protection. In 1982, the Supreme Court simply excluded child
pornography from First Amendment protection.8 The child pornography decision
is explained as follows:
Justice White, for the Court, in justifying categorical exclusion of child
pornography, stressed the compelling state interest in protecting minors,
the close relation of the distribution of the films and photographs to the
sexual abuse of children and the motivation for the production of such
materials resulting from sales and advertising revenues.9
A focus on the harm speech can cause is exemplified by the writings of
Professor Catharine MacKinnon. Professor MacKinnon powerfully joins the
themes of harm and equality in an effort to remove female pornography from the
realm of First Amendment protection: "What pornography does goes beyond its
content: It eroticises hierarchy, it sexualizes inequality. It makes dominance and
submission sex. Inequality is its central dynamic."' In her view, pornography is
not harmless; rather, she contends: "[Pornography] institutionalizes the sexuality
of male supremacy, fusing the eroticisation of dominance and submission with
the social construction of male and female.""
However, those who ask that hate speech and female pornography be
removed from the domain of protected speech are not responsible for the increase
in legal redress for the consequences of violence in the media. But these liberal
writers have contributed to weakening the previously impregnable citadel of First
Amendment absolutism. There is a strong conservative values-oriented critique
of First Amendment absolutism that is more responsible for developments
designed to bring violence in the media to some kind of accountability. The
success of this conservative critique in the past is evidenced in the longstanding
exception for obscenity to First Amendment protection and is further illustrated
by the complete exception for child pornography. I shall discuss the impact of
this conservative critique in securing redress for violence in the media when I
discuss the opinions of Judges Michael Luttig and Edith Jones.
A further indication that the classic North American position on the
inviolability of free expression is being challenged is found in the recent decision
of the Supreme Court of Canada on female pornography, Regina v. Butler.2 The
8. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
9. See JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 375 (2d. ed.
1991) (referring to New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)).
10. MacKinnon, supra note I.
I. Id.
12. Regina v. Butler, [1992] S.C.R. 452. An American case, on the other hand, invalidated an
Indianapolis, Indiana ordinance prohibiting female pornography as violative of the First Amendment. Am.
Booksellers Ass'n. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985). The latter was defined by the ordinance as "the
graphic sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures or in words .. " Id. at 324. Speaking for
the Seventh Circuit, Judge Easterbrook said: "The state may not ordain preferred viewpoints in this way. The
Constitution forbids the state to declare one perspective right and silence opponents." Id. at 325.
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Supreme Court of Canada held in 1992 that such material can be regulated. 3 It
should be noted that one part of the statute at issue in the Canadian case declared
that: material which represents or portrays explicit sex with violence is obscene.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada, unlike the Supreme Court of the United
States in the R.A. V. case, has upheld in the Regina v. Keegstra case the regulation
of racist propaganda on a harmful effect rationale, which was also deeply rooted
in the idea of equality.
14
II. ALTERNATIVES FOR LEGAL CONTROLS ON VIOLENT CONTENT
The significance of this radical change in First Amendment theory in the
United States from both the left and the right has the most important implications
for the development of legal controls on violence in film and television. The
findings of social science research-the relationship between exposure to violent
programming and aggressive or antisocial behavior-could possibly find greater
expression in legal controls than was previously thought possible. Given the
influence of music, film, and television programming created in the United States
around the world, changes in First Amendment theory merit serious attention.
In short, the whole issue of what are appropriate legal controls on violence in
film and television in particular must take account of this phenomenon-the
decline of absolutism in First Amendment theory in the United States. There is,
increasingly, great concern about the harm that speech can do to individuals.
Similarly, there is less reflexive dismissal of those harms than was the case in the
past. Those victimized by certain categories of speech are not deemed automatically
less important than the inflexibility of the free speech principle. A new sensitivity
to the relationship of the free speech principle to individual harm has emerged.
This phenomenon will have great influence in charting the development of
responses to the problem of violence in film and television.
If our society is at last willing to confront the issue of legal controls on
violent content in the media, what responses can law offer to address this
problem consistent with our tradition of free expression? On this question, I will
discuss three possible alternatives. First, I will discuss the channeling alternative.
Next, I will address the tort liability alternative. Finally, I will discuss indirect
controls and self-regulation.
A. The Channeling Alternative
One way to deal with the problem of the violence quotient in film and
television is by way of analogy to obscenity. The United States Supreme Court's
approach to obscenity has been to create a definition sufficiently exact to be able
13. Butler, S.C.R. at 455-56.
14. Regina v. Keegstra, [19901 S.C.R. 697. See Kathleen Mahoney, R. v. Keegstra: A Rationale for
Regulating Pornography?, 37 MCGILL L.J. 242 (1992) for a discussion of Keegstra.
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to narrowly target the material which society decides to proscribe without
jeopardizing the full and free discourse which society desires to encourage. 5 The
treatment in our law of sexually-oriented content transcends the specific issue of
obscenity. Our law has developed very subtle and complex distinctions among
the varieties of sexually-oriented content. Indeed, sexually-oriented content may
be divided into at least four separate categories, each of which receives different
First Amendment treatment. These categories are (1) obscenity, (2) indecency,
(3) child pornography, and (4) pornography that degrades and debases women.
Child pornography, like obscenity, receives no First Amendment protection.
6
Attempts have been made to place female pornography-pornography which
degrades and debases women-in a similarly unprotected category of speech.
Efforts in this direction have been particularly active at the local level, but none
of these efforts have survived a First Amendment challenge. 17 Indecent expression
can be channeled, even sanctioned, but it cannot be prohibited absolutely.
Clearly, in our society and in our law, sexually-oriented content is highly
regulated and highly scrutinized. The process by which our legal system divides
sexually-oriented content into distinct categories illustrates the high degree of
regulation and scrutinization of such content. Our law has not made similar
distinctions within the broad category of violent programming. Indeed, our law
basically does not regulate violent programming at all. Why have we been so
willing to subject sexually-oriented content to dissection and regulation and so
unwilling to regulate violent programming? Two reasons suggest themselves.
The first reason is the Puritan tradition and its heritage of sexual inhibition and
moral rectitude. The other reason is that the musket and the rifle were formidable
factors in the settling of this country.
May we treat the problem of violence on television similarly to the way we
treat the various forms of sexually-oriented expression? Could we craft a
definition of violence sufficiently exact to target excessively violent material and
leave the stream of public discourse otherwise untrammeled? Is violence
susceptible to such treatment? The answer to these questions is hardly clear.
Some may say we should not even explore this question. Why? They say that we
would be regulating content and that the state has no business regulating content.
In the United States, this latter position represents the classic First Amendment
position. Like all absolutes, there is something impressive about the scope of this
statement. Again, like many absolutes, upon examination it turns out that this
absolute is less encompassing than advertised. The very existence of a law of
obscenity and a law of indecent expression demonstrates that we do make
distinctions in our law. Some categories of content enjoy less First Amendment
protection than others.
15. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
16. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
17. See Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affd without opinion, Hudnut
v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
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Indecency, in particular, receives rather unusual and elaborate treatment in
the law affecting television. Indeed, the treatment by our law of indecent
expression offers the most helpful analogy to the problem of violent content on
television. Indecency has a special status in First Amendment law. It is protected
speech, but it may be regulated. Indecency, unlike obscenity, may not be
absolutely barred or prohibited, but it may be channeled. What channeling means
is that indecent programming is permissible if it is televised at an hour when the
great mass of children cannot be expected to be in the television audience.
Indeed, defined perimeters have established what is called a "safe harbor,"
whereby broadcasters and cable casters are assured that if they limit indecent
programming to the safe harbor of 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., they will not be
subject to the sanctions which the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
otherwise applies to enforce its policy against indecent programming.1
8
Creating a safe harbor for indecency in broadcasting, or to put it another
way-barring indecent content for much of the broadcast day-has been
defended as follows:
The data on broadcasting that the FCC has collected reveal that large
numbers of children view television or listen to the radio from the early
morning until late in the evening, that those numbers decline rapidly as
midnight approaches, and that a substantial portion of the adult audience
is tuned into television or radio broadcasts after midnight. We find this
information sufficient to support the safe harbor parameters that Congress
has drawn.' 9
If a similar safe harbor policy were applied to violent programming, would
such a safe harbor policy withstand First Amendment attack? So far, the
American courts which have considered whether the safe harbor policy for
indecent programming violates the First Amendment have concluded that such a
policy is valid. Certainly, one alternative to the violence quotient in television
programming is not to prohibit such programming, but rather to channel it.
In fact, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires television manufacturers
starting in 1998 to equip all sets with a screen of thirteen inches or more with a
device to enable viewers to block all programs with a common rating. This is the
celebrated V-Chip. We are all now quite familiar with these common ratings for
cable movies: (1) "V" for "violent content," (2) "S" for "sexual content," (3) "L"
for "coarse language," and (4) "D" for "suggestive dialogue."
18. See Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-356, § 16(a), 106 Stat. 949, 954
(1992), upheld as modified, in Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 516 U.S. 1043 (1996).
19. Action for Children's Television, 58 F.3d at 665 (quoting Judge Buckley writing the opinion for the
majority).
20. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 551, 110 Stat. 56, 139 (1996) (codified in
47 U.S.C. §§ 303(w), 303(x) (2001)).
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 33
A parent with a television set equipped with a V-Chip can now simply block
out or ban from her household programming rated "V" for violent content. The
V-Chip enables the parent to exercise control over the programming that comes
across the household television screen. V-Chip technology gives parents channeling
authority'.2 Interestingly, existing data tells us that the V-Chip has been little used by
the households that own one.
Channeling violent content in television is theoretically an alternative legal
control. But, it is not a legal control that government is likely to adopt. Violent
content is a porous and imprecise term. Critics of the indecency concept contend
that the term "indecency" is hopelessly vague and subjective and is therefore
totally inadequate for use as a category in First Amendment law. That view has
not prevailed. The term "violent content" is, if anything, even more elusive than
the indecency concept. The difficulties inherent in justifying the channeling of
violent content come readily to mind. If someone is stabbed in a televised opera,
is that violent content? Is Hamlet so suffused with violent content that it must be
channeled beyond the bedtime hours of children? If a historical drama is presented
on television portraying the famous duel between Aaron Burr and Alexander
Hamilton, a duel where Hamilton was killed, should such a portrayal be
channeled? Violent content may arguably be an adequate basis for editing the
television viewing of children in the hands of parents. But it is certainly too
clumsy and too restrictive a tool in the hands of the state.
B. Tort Liability Alternative
Despite the new First Amendment theorists and the emphasis on harms to the
victim and to society caused by some categories of speech, the established law in
the United States with respect to tort liability for violent content is, of course, still
reflective of the older classic First Amendment theory. In this conception, the
harms to the victim caused by speech are outweighed by the risks that
government intervention would present to the overall maintenance of free speech
in the society. But some dramatic changes have occurred, changes which mirror
the arguments of the theorists I mentioned earlier.
In the United States, tort liability has generally not been imposed against
television companies for harms caused by their programming. An incitement test
has played a major role in limiting-indeed, in immunizing-television and film
companies for the harms caused by programming. Perhaps the most influential
case is Olivia N. v. NBC,23 one of the so-called "copycat" cases.
21. DONALD M. GILLMOR, JEROME A. BARRON & TODD F. SIMON, MASS COMMUNICATION LAW:
CASES AND COMMENT 841-42 (6th ed. 1998).
22. See Clay Calvert & Robert Richards. Larn., Flynt Uncensored: A Dialogue with the Most Controversial Figure
in First Amendment Jurisprudence. 9 COMM. LAW CONSPEMnJS 159, 168 n.74 (2001).
23. 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (C. App. 1981).
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In Olivia N., a television viewer perpetrated upon a female minor an act
suggested to him by an artificial rape scene he had seen in a television movie,
Born Innocent.24 The California Court of Appeals considered and discussed most
of the arguments that have been used for subjecting, in some circumstances at
least, television companies to liability. It discounted the view accepted by the
United States Supreme Court in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation that regulation of
indecency did not violate the First Amendment. 26 In Pacifica, the Supreme Court
upheld the imposition of a sanction on the use of indecent speech. 2' The Pacifica
holding was grounded on the pervasive effects of television and the unique
access of children to television. The Pacifica Court reasoned that these realities
necessitated a different rule than one that might obtain in other media."
According to the California Court of Appeals, the consequences of applying
the Pacifica approach to harms such as criminal behavior allegedly caused by
television programming would reduce the adult population of the United States to
viewing only what is suitable for children. 29 The court also considered whether
the act perpetrated in the television movie was an incitement. 3 This was an
important question since incitement to unlawful actions are not protected under
the First Amendment. But the court held that the film did not advocate or
encourage lawless action." In Olivia N., the California Court of Appeals set forth
the reasons why as a general proposition it chose not to permit negligence actions
to succeed against television companies for harms caused by television broadcasts:
Realistically, television networks would become significantly more inhibited
in the selection of controversial materials if liability were to be imposed
on a simple negligence theory .... The deterrent effect of subjecting the
television networks to negligence liability because of their programming
choices would ... dampen the vigor and limit the variety of public
debate.32
Let us turn to yet another "copycat" case. The scene is Boston in 1979. A
sixteen-year-old, Martin Yakubowicz, has died from a knife wound intentionally
inflicted on him by one Michael Barrett.3" Michael had just come from a movie
theater after viewing the movie The Warriors.4 This stabbing occurred after
24. Id. at 891.
25. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
26. Olivia N., 178 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
27. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 750.
28. Id. at 748-49.
29. Olivia N., 178 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 892.
33. Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067, 1068 (Mass. 1989).
34. Id.
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youth "gangs" in both Boston and California reacted violently and with threats of
violence after seeing the movie. The movie theater in Boston was operated by
Saxon Theater Corporation and Paramount Pictures. Both the movie theater
operator and Paramount Pictures were aware of this behavior by youth gangs
seeing the picture. The father of the slain boy now sues the movie theater operator
and Paramount Pictures for wrongful death. Should there be liability? The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that there should be no liability.35
Justice O'Connor of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court described the
film, The Warriors:
The film includes numerous scenes of juvenile gang-related violence in
which youths battle with knives, guns, and other weapons as they pursue
one gang, the "Warriors," through the subways of New York City.
Advertising for the film depicted menacing youths wielding baseball
bats.36
Three days before Martin Yakubowicz was slain, two youths were killed in
Palm Springs and Oxnard, California near theaters which were showing The
Warriors. Paramount then ordered each of the theaters around the country
showing The Warriors to hire extra security guards. Paramount offered to pay for
extra security. Saxon Theaters accepted the offer of extra security and indicated
that problems with vandalism had been reported at showings of The Warriors.
Following the stabbing of Martin Yakubowicz, Paramount offered to release
theater owners from their contractual obligation to show The Warriors. In its
telegram to the exhibitors of The Warriors, Paramount stated: "Please be advised
that in the event you believe that the exhibition of this motion picture in your
theatre poses a risk to persons or property, then Paramount will relieve you of
your obligation to exhibit the picture. ... ""
Although Saxon received this telegram, it continued to exhibit The Warriors
through April 5, 1979. The Born Innocent and The Warriors cases raise a
threshold question on the issue of causation. Did the violent content of a television
program or film actually cause the violence complained of? It is interesting that
Paramount Pictures was not in doubt on the causation issue in The Warriors case.
The exhibitors were told that in case they believed the picture, The Warriors,
posed a risk to persons or property, Paramount would release them from showing
the picture. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in The Warriors case,
held that the exhibitor and the producer were not liable. Did the court hold that
Paramount and Saxon were not negligent in exhibiting the film in the circumstances?
Not really. Basically, what the court said is "that the defendants could not properly
be found to have violated their duty of reasonable care by exercising protected rights
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1069.
37. Id. at 1070.
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of free speech."38 This is not, therefore, a conclusion that due care was exercised.
It is rather a conclusion that the First Amendment should not permit the courts to
resolve whether due care was exercised. This, of course, is the dominant First
Amendment ideology: free expression is more important than the safeguarding of
human life that the imposition of tort liability would further. Why? Presumably, it
is because such liability would result in self-censorship by film and television
producers in the future-all to the detriment of innovation and experimentation
in film and television in the future. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
also held that the film, The Warriors, did not constitute an incitement: "Although
the film is rife with violent scenes, it does not at any point exhort, urge, entreat,
solicit, or overtly advocate or encourage unlawful or violent activity on the part
of viewers."'3 9
I mention The Warriors case because I think it is illustrative: American law
on the whole has been unwilling to deal with the consequences of violence in
film and television. If the test of liability in negligence cases such as these is
incitement, then immunity from liability for the producers of television and film
is virtually assured. Clearly, television and film producers did not intend either
generally or specifically to incite a particular individual to imitate in life the
violent acts which they see perpetrated in front of them as entertainment. The
incitement test is simply inadequate to cope with the harms that may flow from
the violent quotient in film and television.
One might say that this is too pessimistic an account. It is true that in 1975,
the Supreme Court of California did hold that the First Amendment would not
preclude the imposition of liability against a radio station for the death of a
motorist who was killed as a result of a promotion sponsored by the station. 4 The
station was offering a prize to anyone who could locate the station's disc
jockey.4 In their haste to win the contest and reach the disc jockey's location,
two teenagers driving separate cars forced a car off the road and thereby killed
the car's driver. The Supreme Court of California declared that the foreseeable
results of the broadcast created an undue risk of harm and that the First
Amendment would not preclude liability in such circumstances: "The First
Amendment does not sanction the infliction of physical injury merely because
achieved by word, rather than act. 43
A case that struggles with whether the harm that speech can do should permit
the creation of new categories of unprotected expression is Herceg v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc.44 In August 1981, Hustler Magazine printed an article entitled
38. Id. at 1071.
39. Id.
40. Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975).
41. Id. at 37.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 40.
44. 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987).
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"Orgasms of Death" which discussed autoerotic asphyxiation. This is a practice
which involves "masturbation while 'hanging' oneself in order to temporarily cut
off the blood supply to the brain at the moment of orgasm. ' ' The article's
heading stated that the story was published to increase awareness about sexual
matters, to reduce readers' inhibitions, and to make readers better lovers. At the
same time, Hustler Magazine cautioned its readers that the practice described in
the article was fraught with danger and often led to fatalities. Hustler Magazine
further warned its readers that those who sought "unique forms of sexual release
[should not attempt] this method."' The body of the article went on to describe
the "high" and the "thrill" achieved by those who indulge in this practice but at
the same time, the article warned that the practice was "neither healthy nor
harmless.
47
A 14-year-old boy, Troy D., read the article and attempted to engage in
autoerotic asphyxia.48 The result was that he was found dead the next morning,
hanged by the neck in his closet.49 Young Troy read a magazine article which
persuaded him to engage in an act that ended his life. Should the publisher of that
magazine be held liable for civil damages? The Fifth Circuit panel of three
judges decided, two-to-one, that Hustler Magazine should not be held liable.0
They did so on the basis of classic First Amendment philosophy. Constitutional
protection for freedom of speech and press is not predicated on the idea that
speech in itself cannot inflict harm. Instead, its premise is that the benefits of the
free flow of speech and ideas outweighs the costs of the harm that speech sometimes
undoubtedly causes. The court pointed out that the speech involved did not fall
into any of the categories that our law has recognized as unprotected:
The Supreme Court has recognized that some types of speech are excluded
from, or entitled only to narrow constitutional protection. Freedom of
speech does not protect obscene materials, child pornography, fighting
words, incitement to imminent lawless activity, and purposefully-made or
recklessly-made false statements of fact such as libel, defamation, or fraud.
Whatever the problems created in attempting to categorize speech in such
fashion, the Hustler article fits none of them.5'
Hustler is clearly a case where the written word led to the death of a young
boy. The writer of the article did not know the child nor did he intend to expose
him to danger, but that was the consequence of the article. In these circumstances,
the majority of the court concluded that "first amendment protection is not
45. Id. at 1018.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1019.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1025.
51. Id. at 1020 (footnotes omitted).
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eliminated simply because publication of an idea creates a potential hazard."" At
the time of the Hustler decision, the result reached by the majority expressed the
sense of the existing law. In short, the majority followed the law. But surely a
question occurs to many of us as we think about this case. The result here may be
what classic First Amendment doctrine demands. But is it just?
In an opinion in which she both concurred with and dissented from the
majority opinion, Judge Edith Jones explained why she found the majority
opinion troubling in some respects. She asked rhetorically why it was not within
the power of a state to fashion a remedy to save the lives of its children when
they were "endangered by suicidal pornography." 3 She further observed that "no
federal court has held that death is a legitimate price to pay for freedom of
speech." ' She specifically addressed the issue of whether communicators of
violent content can, consistent with the First Amendment, be subjected to
liability. She observed that it was not impossible to delineate in this case between
speech that was protected and speech that was not protected. Furthermore, she
pointed out what I have stressed-that there has been in the past an
indiscriminate approach to liability actions seeking damages for the harms that
occasionally may flow from media content. The traditional approach has been
characterized by a refusal to make distinctions. This has now greatly changed: "a
hierarchy of first amendment speech classifications has in fact developed largely
in the last few years, and there is no reason to assume the hierarchy is ineluctable."55
Clearly, there are a number of cases where plaintiffs sue on behalf of
relatives who have met either serious injury or death reacting to or imitating
violent images they first saw on the television screen or in a movie theater. But
the response of the law to the victims and kin of these encounters has not been
encouraging. Typically, these plaintiffs bring negligence suits against media
defendants. Sometimes, of course, if the violent image is sufficiently egregious
and the resulting injuries or death are particularly shocking, a sympathetic trial
judge or jury will find a verdict or judgment for the plaintiff. In the past, these
cases were almost always reversed by higher courts on the ground that the First
Amendment protection enjoyed by the media defendant should trump the tort
action of the individual plaintiff.
But the legal winds on these issues may be blowing in a new direction. Braun
v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc. illustrates this point. 6 Liability was imposed
on the magazine for publishing a classified ad creating an unreasonable risk of
soliciting violent criminal activity. The imposition of liability was held not
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1025 (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting).
54. Id. at 1026.
55. Id. at 1027 (footnote omitted).
56. 968 F.2d II10( lthCir. 1992).
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violative of the First Amendment.57 The ad created a clear risk of substantial
danger of harm to the public.
Michael Savage placed an ad in Soldier of Fortune magazine. The ad was
very explicit:
GUN FOR HIRE: 37 year old professional mercenary desires jobs.
Vietnam Veteran. Discrete [sic] and very private. Body guard,
courier, and other special skills. All jobs considered.58
Savage ran the ad for ten months and received a surprisingly substantial
response from those seeking his assistance for murder, kidnapping, and assault.
Among those who responded to Savage's ad were Bruce Gastwirth and a
business associate, John Horton Moore; they contacted Savage about plans to
murder Richard Braun.59 Savage, Moore, and one other, Sean Trevor Doutre,
went to Richard Braun's home. 6° As Richard Braun and his son Michael were
driving down their driveway, Doutre stepped in front of Richard Braun's car and
fired several shots into the car with an automatic pistol.6' The shots wounded
Michael in the thigh." Richard was wounded as well but managed to roll out of
the car." As Richard Braun lay on the ground, Doutre walked over to him and
killed him by firing two shots into the back of his head.64
Michael Braun and his brother brought a wrongful death action in federal
court against the magazine for the death of their father; Michael also brought a
personal injury action. The brothers contended that Soldier of Fortune magazine
negligently published an article that presented a risk that violent crime, including
murder, would be solicited and committed. They introduced evidence which
described links in the past between the magazine's personal service ads and a
variety of crimes such as murder, kidnapping, assault, and extortion.65 They also
introduced evidence that prior to the publication of the Savage ad, law enforcement
officers had contacted the magazine about criminal investigations of a solicitation
57. Id. Judge Anderson in his opinion for the Eleventh Circuit provided a capsule summary of the case:
Soldier of Fortune Magazine ... [hereinafter SOF appeal a $4,375,000 jury verdict against
them in a consolidated tort action brought by Michael and Ian Braun, the sons of a murder
victim. The jury found that SOF acted with negligence and malice in publishing a personal
service advertisement through which plaintiffs' father's business partner hired an assassin to






62. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc.. 968 F.2d at I 110.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1112-13.
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to commit murder in one state and a kidnapping in another-both of which had
connections with Soldier of Fortune personal service ads.
66
The management and editor of Soldier of Fortune denied any awareness of
crimes associated with the magazine's personal service ads prior to running the
ad placed by Michael Savage. 67 The magazine's advertising manager contended
that she had understood the term "Gun For Hire" to mean bodyguard or
protection service personnel. 6' The judge charged the jury that in order to prevail,
the plaintiff had to prove that the ad presented a "clear and present danger of
causing serious harm to the public from violent criminal activity." 69 In addition,
the judge cautioned the jury that a publisher was not under a general obligation to
investigate an ad. ° The plaintiffs therefore had to prove that the offer in the ad
communicated to the reader that an unreasonable risk to commit a violent crime
including murder had been created by the advertiser.7 The trial court referred to
this standard as a "modified" negligence standard. Finally, the judge asked the
jury to consider the facts and the instructions in light of the fact that the First
Amendment "protects the free flow of truthful and legitimate information even
when it is of a commercial rather than a political nature. 72
The jury awarded over $2,375,000 in compensatory damages and $10 million
in punitive damages to the brothers.73 But the trial judge ruled that he would order
a new trial unless the brothers would agree to accept two million dollars in
punitive damages rather than the ten million dollars the jury awarded. Soldier of
Fortune magazine agreed to the reduction in punitive damages and judgment was
entered in the brothers' behalf. Soldier of Fortune then appealed. On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the trial judge's instructions were correct and affirmed
the judgment. 74
The Soldier of Fortune case is extremely important. Judge Anderson for the
Eleventh Circuit rejected powerful First Amendment arguments that were made
by counsel for the publisher. Thus, it was argued that "imposing liability on
publishers for the advertisements they print indirectly threatens core, non-
commercial speech to which the Constitution accords its full protection. 75 If all
advertisements which were ambiguous in terms of the potential harm they might
engender had to be refused, the economic impact from such refusals would
inevitably adversely impact on the editorial content of the publication. Indeed,
counsel for Soldier of Fortune contended "that payment of the jury's verdict
66. Id. at 1113.
67. Id.
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would force the magazine to close and, consequently, would deprive public
debate of [Soldier of Fortune's] protected, non-commercial speech. 76
The Eleventh Circuit said it was mindful that it had to reconcile the state
interest in imposing liability on publishers who run ads which relate to criminal
activity with the First Amendment objective that state law not be permitted to
chill protected expression. The Eleventh Circuit said that the district court's
modified negligence standard did exactly that. The district court had stressed that
the jury could find Soldier of Fortune negligent only if Savage's advertisement
''on its face" would have alerted a reasonably prudent publisher "that the ad in
question contained a clearly identifiable unreasonable risk, that the offer in the ad
is one to commit a serious violent crime."77 The Court of Appeals held that the
First Amendment permitted the use of this "modified" negligence standard.78
An even more dramatic case involving violent content resulted in liability for
the publisher of two books with provocative titles. One book was entitled Hit
Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors, and the other was
entitled How to Make a Disposable Silencer. James Perry bought and read both
books.79 Perry was hired by a man to kill the man's ex-wife, his eight-year-old
paraplegic son, and the son's nurse."' The apparent motivation for the killings
was to permit the husband to collect two million dollars that had been awarded in
a settlement for injuries to his son.8' The media defendant placed all of its trust on
the First Amendment. The parties stipulated that the publisher would be civilly
liable for aiding and abetting James Perry in his triple murder unless the First
Amendment presented an absolute bar to the imposition of liability on the
publisher for its role in assisting the commission of the crimes." The media
defendant lost its gamble. Judge Luttig for the court held "that the First Amendment
does not pose a bar to a finding that Paladin [the publisher] is civilly liable as an
aider and abetter of Perry's triple contract murder."83 The federal district court
had held that Hitman was protected advocacy. Judge Luttig for the Court of
Appeals said this ruling was the result of misunderstanding the governing
standard of Brandenburg v. Ohio84 "as having distinguished between 'advocating
or teaching' lawlessness on the one hand, and 'inciting or encouraging' lawlessness
on the other, any and all of the former being entitled to First Amendment
protection." ' The district court failed to understand the kind of teaching which was
protected under Brandenburg: "[I]t is not teaching simpliciter, but only 'the mere
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1113.
78. Id. at 1119.
79. Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 241-42 (4th Cir. 1997).
80. Id. at 239.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 241 n.2.
83. Id. at 243.
84. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
85. Rice, 128 F.3d. at 263.
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abstract teaching ... of the moral propriety or even moral necessity' for resort to
lawlessness, or its equivalent, that is protected under the commands of Brandenburg.86
The Court of Appeals did not think that the so-called Brandenburg test, the
standard test for media liability when media defendants are sued for the
consequences of the violent quotient in media content, was a bar to media
liability in this situation. Brandenburg, decided in 1969, was the last incarnation
given by the Supreme Court to what originally was called the "clear and present
danger" doctrine. Arising in the context of a Klan rally-and what we would call
today hate speech-and thus far afield from the criminal syndicalism and
Communist cases where the "clear and present danger" doctrine was originally
applied, the test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Brandenburg is notable both
for its brevity and for its abiding influence in media liability cases. The Court in a
per curiam opinion said that its prior precedents
fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech
and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of
the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action."
Professor Rodney Smolla describes the approach he took on behalf of the
plaintiffs in the Hitman case as follows: "Brandenburg does not insulate a
defendant from liability when the defendant's speech goes beyond the bounds of
abstract advocacy and into the realm of providing specific instruction that aids
and abets another in the commission of a criminal offense." S Smolla's argument-
abstract teaching or advocacy of unlawful action was protected expression but
that "concrete preparation and instruction to aid and abet crime" was not
protected expression-succeeded. 9 The court ruled that the Hitman manual fell
in the latter category. ' '
Many media organizations filed amici briefs to the court prior to the decision
in the Hitman case. These organizations warned that if the court reached a result
adverse to the publisher, freedom of speech and the press would be severely
chilled. Judge Luttig was startled by this argument:
That the national media organizations would feel obliged to vigorously
defend Paladin's assertion of a constitutional right to intentionally and
knowingly assist murderers with technical information which Paladin
admits it intended and knew would be used immediately in the
86. Id. at 263-64 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)).
87. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
88. Rodney A. Smolla, Should the Brandenburg v. Ohio Incitement Test Apply in Media Violence Tort
Cases?. 27 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 38-39 (2000).
89. Id. at 39.
90. Rice, 128 F.3d at 264-65.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 33
commission of murder and other crimes against society is, to say the
least, breathtaking. 91
Paladin argued that if liability is imposed for aiding and abetting, liability
would soon be extended to so-called "copycat" conduct where the actor imitates
what is seen on television or read in print. Judge Luttig denied that the decision
could have any such far-reaching adverse impact on freedom of expression. In
the "copycat" situation, the disseminator does not intend to assist someone else in
committing a violent crime. "Copycat" conduct occurs in situations where "the
information for the dissemination of which liability is sought" has been
misused.92 In the aiding and abetting situation, the information is being used
exactly as intended. The significance of this distinction would surely limit media
liability." Furthermore, Judge Luttig speculated that it would be a rare case
indeed where there would be a situation where a publisher would stipulate in
"almost taunting defiance that it intended to assist murderers" and where there
would also be "evidence extraneous to the speech itself which would support a
finding of the requisite intent. ' 94
The Hitman case clearly breaks new ground in our First Amendment law. It
either places detailed teaching on how to commit a crime on the incitement side
of the line and hence such activity is not protected, or it creates a new
unprotected category of expression-detailed teaching about crime in itself
constitutes aiding and abetting. Either interpretation creates a new category of
unprotected expression. Judge Luttig does not acknowledge that he is taking First
Amendment law in a new direction. Indeed, he insists that the effect of this
decision will be slight. I think the Hitman decision charts a new path altogether.
The decision tells us that some violent content, even though it may not constitute
an incitement, still does not receive First Amendment protection. Hitman is thus
an important chapter in the development of a new category of unprotected
expression-violent content albeit in the area of civil liability for aiding and
abetting the commission of a crime.
Cases like Hitman and Soldier of Fortune illustrate the waning influence of
First Amendment absolutism. The law in the area of tort liability for the consequences
of violent media content is taking a new direction. The traditional understanding
that media content, unless it falls into one of the unprotected categories, is
immune from legal redress for the consequences of that content has been shaken.
This does not mean, and it should not mean, that copycat cases will now result in
liability as they did not in the past. But it does mean that in some circumstances,
tort liability for violent media content is possible.
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C. Indirect Controls and Self-Regulation Alternative
The question of identifying and developing controls which can appropriately
be directed to the problem of violence on television and film is complex. But any
discussion of this issue must consider voluntary controls or industry self-
regulation as a third alternative. In movies and television, rating systems have
been voluntarily arrived at by the affected industries. In the case of violent
content, particularly in very recent times, what we witness is the use by
government of these systems as indirect controls. These indirect controls do not,
however, arrive as described; instead, they are presented by government officials
or agencies as exhortations or, more commonly, as recommendations. They are
sermons to the industry, but they have more immediate clout than most sermons.
Usually, the government agency putting out a sermon in the form of a report can,
if it wishes, ultimately wield a club-and the affected industry knows it.
Furthermore, once the agency provides the sermon, legislators in Congress are
often prompted to try to enact the sermon into law.
Controversy about whether government advice to the media industry should
be looked at as indirect government controls is hardly new. In 1974, Committees
of both the House and Senate directed the FCC to submit a report indicating how
they planned to protect children from excessive violence and obscenity in
broadcasting. The course of action that Richard Wiley, Chairman of the FCC,
decided to employ was "jawboning."95 Rather than undertake any formal FCC
action, Chairman Wiley would simply urge the networks to reduce the amount of
sex and violence in television programming. This jawboning included visits by
the Chairman and his staff to the Washington offices of ABC, CBS, and NBC.
As a result of this and many other efforts on the part of Chairman Wiley, "CBS
proposed that the [Code of the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB)] be
amended to [provide] that '[p]rogramming in the first hour of the network prime-
time schedule should be suitable for family viewing."' '
A considerable debate developed over the "family viewing hour" proposal.
Chairman Wiley gave a number of speeches saying that the problem of violence
on television was deemed so serious by some citizens and some members of
Congress as to warrant regulatory action by the FCC. Chairman Wiley thought
that in this very sensitive First Amendment area, reform by industry self-
regulation was the desirable course of action. The FCC expressed similar views
when it filed its Report to Congress (FCC Report).97 Indeed, the FCC Report
made a strong case against regulatory action designed to control violent and
sexually-oriented programming which is neither obscene nor indecent. Regulatory
action would inevitably require balancing the need to protect children and the
95. Writers Guild of Am. v. ABC, 609 F.2d 355, 359 (9th Cir. 1979).
96. Id. at 368.
97. Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent, and Obscene Material, 51 F.C.C.2d 418 (1975).
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need to protect the First Amendment interest of adults in diverse programming. 98
Regulatory action might also lead to "freez[ing] present standards and could also
discourage creative developments in the medium. ' 99
The Television Board of Directors of NAB adopted the family viewing policy
on April 8, 1975 as an amendment to the NAB Television Code."° A number of
organizations, including the Writers Guild of America, brought suit against the
FCC, the three major television networks, and the NAB to challenge the adoption
of the so-called family viewing policy on a number of grounds including the First
Amendment.' °' The federal district court concluded, as did the Court of Appeals,
that "government pressure substantially caused the adoption of the family
viewing policy."'O° This policy, the district court concluded, violated a bedrock
First Amendment principle: decisions on the content of the programming to
appear on the television screen belonged to the broadcast licensee and no one
else.' °3 The Court of Appeals had serious doubts about the district court's opinion.
First, it was not a certainty that the "bedrock principle is correct."'O° Second, it
was doubtful whether the "finding of causation [was] sound."'0 5 But the Court of
Appeals chose not to resolve these issues. Instead, the Court of Appeals vacated
the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to the district
court to send the claims of the plaintiffs against the government to the FCC and
to hold in abeyance the claims of the plaintiffs against the private defendants
pending resolution and judicial review of the FCC proceeding.'06 The FCC soon
abandoned the family viewing hour proposal.
Obviously, as the differing reactions of the two courts that considered this
matter illustrate, the issue here is very much on the line. Is the jawboning done
by the FCC Chairman to get the networks to adopt a family viewing hour free of
sexual and violent content impermissible government action? If it is government
action, is it impermissible government censorship? I mention the family viewing
hour episode in broadcast media history only to contrast it with a very different
kind of government action-the use of government to provide information to the
public and thereby to influence media behavior.
A classic example of a report that was providing information and only
making recommendations but that was also extremely influential and well-
publicized, is the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) report, Marketing Violent
Entertainment to Children: A Review of Self-Regulation and Industry Practice in
98. Id. at 420.
99. Id.
100. Writers Guild, 609 F.2d at 370.
101. Id. at 357-58.
102. Id. at 360.
103. Id. at 360-61.
104. Id. at 361.
105. Id.
106. Writers Guild, 609 F.2d at 358.
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the Motion Picture, Music Recording & Electronic Games Industries which was
issued in September 2000 (FTC Report)."'" The background of the FTC Report is
instructive. After the terrible Columbine High School shootings in Littleton,
Colorado and the massive media and public outpouring of shock and outrage
which greeted it, President Clinton asked the FTC to study whether several media
industries were targeting their advertising of violent content directly to children
and teenagers. The three industries that the FTC was directed to study were the
motion picture industry, the music recording industry, and the electronic games
industry. Radio and television were not included in the FTC's charge in this
regard. The FTC said the President charged it with two specific inquiries. First,
"[d]o the industries promote products they themselves [have identified as
meriting] parental caution in venues where children [constitute] a substantial
percentage of the audience?""0 8 Second, "[a]re these advertisements [designed] to
attract children and teenagers?"'' a The FTC concluded, based on its comprehensive
study of marketing in the industries studied, that the answer to both questions for
all three of the media industries studied was an emphatic "yes. ' ' H
The FTC noted that many media commentators had suggested that the
exposure of teenagers to violent images in the entertainment media contributed to
the murders at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado."' The FTC
acquitted the entertainment media of sole responsibility for violence among the
young. But the FTC pointedly noted that the entertainment industry itself used
the violent quotient of a product as a factor in their parental advisory labeling and
rating systems. The F[C Report stated that its objective was to aid the entertainment
industries in improving their existing self-regulatory systems in order to achieve
the goal of those systems to "help parents make decisions about which
entertainment products their children should and should not view, listen to, or
play."'
1 2
The FTC noted that the present motion picture industry rating system is the
product of a number of factors. Two Supreme Court cases in 1968 upheld the
power of the states to regulate access to materials by children when access to
those same materials for adults could not be restricted."3 One of these cases
suggested that a rating or classification system, if narrowly drawn, would not
offend First Amendment standards.'"4 In order to avoid an idiosyncratic pattern of
107. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, MARKETING VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN: A REVIEW
OF SELF-REGULATION AND INDUSTRY PRACTICES IN THE MOTION PICTURE, MUSIC RECORDING & ELECTRONIC
GAME INDUSTRIES (Sept. 2000) [hereinafter FTC REPORT].
108. Id. at i.
109. Id.
110. Id.
I1 . Id. at 2.
112. Id. at 3-4.
113. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676
(1968).
114. Interstate Circuit, 390 U.S. at 690.
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widely varying and restrictive local classification standards, the motion picture
industry developed a single national ratings standard.' 5
The current ratings are well known, but I shall list them and then indicate
what the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and the National
Association of Theatre Owners (NATO) say about them in terms of violence.
The current ratings are: (1) "G" for "general audiences" where all ages are
admitted (violence is minimal); (2) "PG" for "parental guidance suggested,"
which indicates that "some material may not be suitable for children" (horror and
violence do not exceed moderate levels); (3) "PG-13" for "parents strongly
cautioned," which means that "some material may be inappropriate for children
under thirteen" (rough or persistent violence is absent); (4) "R" for "restricted,"
wherein anyone "under seventeen [this age varies among jurisdictions] requires
accompanying parent or adult guardian" (this rating may be assigned due to,
among other things, a film's use of violence); and (5) "NC-17" for "no one
seventeen and under admitted" because "the film may contain scenes of
excessive violence" (this rating does not, however, signify that the rated film is
obscene or pornographic in terms of sex, language, or violence)."'
Although the FTC was careful not to evaluate the content of the industry
rating system, the FTC Report suggests that, as far as the violence quotient in
movies is concerned, the line between "PG-13" and "R" movies is not as distinct
as it should be, and some movies are described as "PG-13" in ways that suggest
they should be classified as "R" movies."7 The rating system of the MPAA
considers the explanation for a particular rating an integral part of the rating
system. The FTC stated that an explanation such as "[r]ated PG-13 for intense
horror sequences" is "as much a part of the rating as the letter symbol.""' The
MPAA provides these explanations to reviewers and theaters to aid in describing
a particular picture to the public. But the MPAA does not require that this
information be included in movie advertising. Indeed, the FTC reported that the
movie studios do not include these explanations in their ads." 9 But the FTC's
third report on marketing violent entertainment to children indicates that many
movie studios include the reasons for a particular rating, such as violent
content. ,
21 )
In the FTC Report, the FTC declared that it conducted its study to address a
central question: ' was violent entertainment being marketed to children? In
115. FTC REPORT, supra note 107, at 5.
116. I. at 6-7.
117. Id. at 8.
118. Id. at 10.
119. hi.
120. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, MARKETING VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN: A ONE-
YEAR FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF INDUSTRY PRACTICES IN THE MOTION PICTURE, Music RECORDING &
ELECTRONIC GAME INDUSTRIES 9 (Dec. 2001).
12 1. FTC REPORT, supra note 107, at 12.
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response to this question, the FTC answered with an unequivocal "yes."' 22 Based
on its findings, the FTC concluded that each of the three industries studied
targeted "children under 17 as the audience for movies, music, and games" that
the industries themselves acknowledged were "inappropriate for children" or
warranted "parental caution due to their level of violent content."'' 23 The FTC then
issued a damning conclusion. The FTC said that it believed "by targeting
children when marketing these products, the entertainment industries undermine
their own programs and limit the effectiveness of the parental review upon which
these programs are based."
24
The FTC made a number of specific recommendations, all designed to
improve the workings of the self-regulatory systems already in place in each
industry. But the FTC Report concluded with a warning. Self-regulatory
programs require monitoring if they are to work, and they require sanctions if
they are violated. For First Amendment reasons, the FTC said the affected
industries were in the best position both to monitor compliance and to sanction
noncompliance.121 Is the FTC Report indirect regulation, direct regulation or no
regulation at all? The FTC Report has a great deal to say with respect to
recommendations that would assist the more effective functioning of the existing
voluntary rating systems. But it was very laconic indeed on what sanctions were
appropriate for non-compliance. Recommendations from a government agency
were one thing, but proposing sanctions for media industries was quite another.
Furthermore, the FTC Report on the marketing practices of several media
industries in the light of their own rating systems should be contrasted with the
FCC's ill-fated family viewing hour policy which was developed not by the
industry, but by the FCC Chairman.
In April 2001, the FTC issued a follow-up report on industry advertising
practices (2001 FTC Report). 2 6 The 2001 FTC Report continued to emphasize
self-regulation. The 2001 FTC Report found improvements in the ad practices of
the motion picture industry and the electronic game industries, but not in the
music recording industry. In the 2001 FTC Report, as in its previous one, the
FTC adhered to its belief that "vigilant self-regulation is the best approach to
ensuring that parents are provided with adequate information to guide their
children's exposure to entertainment media with violent content."'2 7 The FTC was
particularly concerned that media advertising practices should not undermine the
media industry's self-imposed rating system. Of course, FTC review of the
122. Id.
123. Id. at 52-53.
124. Id. at 53.
125. Id. at 56.
126. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION. MARKETING VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN: A SIX-
MONTH FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF INDUSTRY PRACTICES IN THE MOTION PICTURE, MUSIC RECORDING &
ELECTRONIC GAME INDUSTRIES (Apr. 2001).
127. Id. at iii.
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marketing of violent entertainment is not the only example of government
involvement in issues concerning violent content. 128
When the government exhorts particular media industries to adhere to their
own self-regulation standards, is it actually regulating? The FCC by restricting an
entire category of programming-indecent programming-to specific hours, the
"safe harbor" from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., directly regulates. The FTC's
recommendation on desirable and undesirable advertising practices in the
marketing of violent entertainment in light of the industry's own standards is far
from this kind of direct regulation.
Robert Corn-Revere, a lawyer who represents entertainment industry clients,
argues that "the real significance of the FTC report ... was not its findings but
the reactions it provoked."'29 While the FTC only sought to modify the existing
self-regulatory systems, Corn-Revere points out that Congressional reactions
were less restrained. Corn-Revere points out that "Vice President Al Gore
threatened to institute suits for 'unfair and deceptive advertising' if the respective
industries failed to mend their ways within six months."' Corn-Revere concludes:
"Despite the FTC's more moderate recommendations, the legacy of its report
may constitute direct regulation of the media." ''
On the other hand, Professor Ray Surette has pointed out a benefit from the
approach taken by the FTC in its report on the marketing of violent entertainment
to children. Monitoring industry's self-imposed regulation of violent products
neatly avoids the vexing problem of defining violence by focusing solely on
those products that the entertainment industries themselves had designated as
violent.'3 2 Letting the media or entertainment industry define violence does not
necessarily avoid First Amendment issues. Arguably, it may simply intensify the
gravity of these issues. Fear of government regulation may engender an industry
response which, absent that fear, would not be forthcoming at all. The industry
out of concern for its economic security may censor itself on a voluntary basis far
more stringently than the government would do directly. But viewed from
another perspective, government examination of the entertainment industry's
self-imposed regulations is quite ingenious. The government in such circumstances
does not need to develop standards, but rather to monitor those developed by
private industry.
The government should not be disabled from pointing out abuses by the
entertainment and media industries on the ground that the exposure of abuses
128. On March 23, 2000, the Seventh Circuit, per Judge Posner, enjoined, on the basis of the First
Amendment, an Indiana ordinance that sought to limit the access of minors to video games that depict violence.
Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
129, Robert Corn-Revere, Getting Violent Over Media: Real Debates Not About Violence, It's About
Cultural Aesthetics, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., (Atlanta, Ga.), Sept. 26, 2000.
130. hI.
131. Id.
132. Ray Surette, The Promise and the Realirv-Peddling Violent Entertainment to Children, WORLD
AND I, Apr. 1, 2001, at 267.
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may prompt politicians to suggest unconstitutional remedies. The idea that the
First Amendment rights of these industries should be inflated to the point that the
government is disabled even from pointing out what they are doing is unacceptable.
III. CONCLUSION
This article has discussed three responses to the violent quotient in media
content. The first of these responses was channeling. Channeling differs from
regulation conceived of as prohibition. Channeling permits programming with
violent content to be televised but channels it to the later hours of the evening as
is currently done with indecent programming. At the present time, the government
has not employed this alternative. The government has facilitated for parents the
option of prohibiting violent programming. New television sets must be equipped
with a V-Chip which permits parents to block violent programming from their
households. However, of those households that have new television sets equipped
with the V-Chip, the number actually using it is very small indeed. The government
is unlikely to channel violent programming as it has done with indecent
programming. The reason for this is that violent programming is both more
pervasive and more indeterminate in terms of identification than indecent
programming.
The second response of the law is the use of tort liability as a remedy and as
a sanction for the consequences of violent media content. The law in this area has
taken a new direction. Practical consequences have followed theory. Writers,
judges, and scholars who think about First Amendment issues are increasingly
doubtful that a principle of the inviolability of media content should be the
ultimate value in our society. Concern for the character of our society has
battered the absolutist approach to First Amendment questions. Liberal scholars
have pointed to the harms that flow from hate speech and female pornography.
Their criticism has weakened the appeal of First Amendment absolutism. The
conservative tradition, as represented by judges such as Michael Luttig and Edith
Jones, has been more directly responsible for the traction for imposing legal
responsibility for the harm caused by violent media images and statements. The
combination of these concerns, coming from both the left and the right, is
transforming traditional thinking about First Amendment law. These critics
underscore the harm that words and images may sometimes cause. The importance
of freedom of expression continues, as it should, to be cherished as one of the
most important values in our society, but increasingly, it is understood that this
does not mean that it should always trump all other values.
In the Hitman case, counsel for the defendants made a stipulation in order to
avoid what they believed would be an unnecessary trial. Professor Smolla,
counsel for the plaintiffs in the Hitman case, summarizes their position: "The
publisher had stipulated for the purposes of a motion for summary judgment that
it marketed the manual to attract and assist criminals, and that it knew and
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intended that the manual would be used, upon receipt, by real murderers to plan
and execute killings."
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The defendant in the Hitman case believed that even the most egregious
content, content that provided a detailed recipe for violence, was fully protected
under the First Amendment, and, therefore, no damages could possibly be
awarded for the consequences of such a publication. This was a stipulation that
truly tested the strength of First Amendment absolutism. First Amendment
absolutism has always been more firmly established in the minds of media
executives and their counsel than it has in the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. When First Amendment absolutism has insisted on its claims,
the Supreme Court has often declined to do it homage.' Finally, a new skeptical
approach to claims of First Amendment absolutism, where the printed word is
involved, is illustrated by the Soldier of Fortune and Hitman cases. American
courts are beginning to impose liability against the media in certain egregious
cases for publications involving tortious conduct and criminal activity. The fact
that the source of the injury is the printed word no longer grants automatic
absolution.
The final response by our law to the problem of violent content in media is
the use of the informing function of government. The government can provide
information on matters affecting the public. The government can even take
positions on controversial issues. As Chief Justice Rehnquist said in Rust v.
Sullivan: 135
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund
a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public
interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which
seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so doing, the
Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has
merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.'
In Rust, the government was really taking a position on a public issue-the
debate about abortion-and had decided to fund the pro-life and not the pro-
choice side of the debate. The FTC action in the FTC Report was much less pro-
133. Smolla, supra note 88, at 30-31.
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salacious content, the Supreme Court refused to grant him the immunity he insisted the First Amendment
extended to him. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). Later, when Ralph Ginzburg charged in one
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active. The media themselves had already taken the position that some of their
products should not be accessed by children. The ratings systems that the media
industries themselves had developed were evidence of that. The FTC Report
merely pointed out that some media industries were targeting children to access
content that their ratings systems were supposedly designed to exclude.
Let us say, however, for the sake of argument that my position that all the
FTC was doing was giving information on media behavior about policies that the
media had adopted is rejected. Let us assume instead that the FTC is really
expressing a commitment to one side of a debate. The debate is about whether
the government should influence the content choices of its people. The opposing
view to what the FTC is doing is that people should be allowed to choose for
themselves the content that they wish without governmental interference. Parents
and not the state should choose the appropriate programming for their children.
This is certainly a responsible point of view. But it is hardly one that is under-
represented in the media. The idea that any governmental comment on media
content is censorship is a view that is abundantly expressed in the media in
particular and in our public discourse. Government-produced information in this
context hardly skews the debate. Instead, it enlarges and enriches the debate. In
conclusion, it seems to me that information furnished by government on the
media's own self-regulatory programs is a much milder form of government
intervention than either channeling violent media content or subjecting it to tort
liability. Governmental information on media behavior measured by guidelines
developed by the media does the least damage to First Amendment interests.
In this article, my discussion spans a broad range of violent media messages-
from news images showing violence (such as the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks), to fictional movies showing it (such as The Warriors), to news articles
reporting on it (like the asphyxiation article), to advertisements to partake in it
(such as Soldier of Fortune), to instructional guides for carrying it out (like
Hitman), to advertisements about the violent content of entertainment products
(the FTC Report), to nonviolent action that results in accidents (such as the radio
contest leading to a car crash). Nonetheless, I think it makes sense to think of
these messages together. The same First Amendment arguments are used to
shield them from either liability or oversight. The overriding theme is that these
arguments are increasingly less persuasive than in the past.
There are now alternatives open to society to cope with violent content in the
media. These alternatives operate within our national commitment to an open
society characterized by freedom of expression. I think that the sum of the
various alternatives that have been developed to deal with the issue of violent
content in the media show a trend. Our society and our law is less willing than it
has been in the past to pay homage to First Amendment claims of absolute
protection for violent content in the media. Instead, our law is now more
interested in providing redress for the harmful effects of violent media content.
